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INTRODUCTION

Estate sales frequently boast a variety of goods collected over
decedents’ lifetimes: furniture, jewelry, tableware, even old comic
books or vinyl records. All of these goods—even those subject to
copyright protection—can be resold without further compensating
the copyright holder or original author. If the decedent had
chosen, she also could have sold, lent, or given away those items
during her lifetime, or bequeathed them in her will.
But what if, rather than vintage comic books or records, the
decedent had instead spent thousands of dollars purchasing digital
goods: audio files downloaded from Apple or Google, or e-books
from Amazon?
The first-sale doctrine—which allows those who own physical
copies of songs, books, and movies to transfer that ownership to
someone else—has no direct counterpart in the digital realm
(i.e., downloaded works). As society’s digital appetite continues to
increase, society may want to consider how those purchases are
treated: as “ownership” or as a “lifetime lease.”
1
This article discusses the history of the first-sale doctrine,
2
examines the potential for a digital first-sale doctrine, and discusses
how such a digital first-sale doctrine might be established through
3
legislation, the courts, or the marketplace. Lastly, this article posits
that content licenses and subscription services may render any
4
establishment of a digital first-sale doctrine unnecessary.
II. HISTORY OF THE FIRST-SALE DOCTRINE
A.

The First-Sale Doctrine’s Establishment

Copyright in the United States traces its origins to the
Constitution, which grants to Congress the authority to “promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
5
respective Writings and Discoveries.” The first copyright statute,
enacted in 1790, permitted copyright protection to authors of any
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

See infra Part II.
See infra Part III, IV.
See infra Part V.
See infra Part VI.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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6

“map, chart, [or] book.” That early copyright statute, however, did
not fully address the question of what rights a copyright holder had
to restrict sales—beyond the work’s “first” sale. By the early 1900s,
patent holders had begun restricting future uses of their devices via
7
licenses, and copyright holders sought to assert similar rights. But
where the patent holders succeeded, the copyright owners
ultimately failed.
8
In its 1908 decision Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, the Supreme
Court conclusively established the first-sale doctrine. In that case,
the copyright holder sought to enforce a minimum retail price for
books that it printed and sold at wholesale. To further that goal, it
printed—above the copyright notice—a purported license
9
requiring that the minimum retail price be $1. The defendant
bookseller obtained the books through a third party, and knowing
10
of the purported license, it chose to sell each book for $0.89. The
Supreme Court ruled that after the initial sale—the “first sale”—
copyright holders did not retain any exclusive right to “vend” the
11
copyrighted work.
Congress codified this ruling—and the first-sale doctrine—in
12
the 1909 Copyright Act, creating § 109, which now reads in
relevant part: “[T]he owner of a particular copy or phonorecord
lawfully made under this title, . . . is entitled, without the authority
of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the
13
possession of that copy or phonorecord.” Congress’s purpose was
to allow the exclusive distribution right to be exhausted after the
copyright owner has received the appropriate compensation for

6. Copyright Act of 1790, ch.15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124, 124 (repealed 1831).
7. See, e.g., Am. Cotton-Tie Co. v. Simmons, 106 U.S. 89, 94–95 (1882)
(finding that patent holders could enforce a license (printed on the device) that
restricted it to one use; a party who obtained, repaired, and reused those devices
effectively infringed the patent-holder’s rights).
8. 210 U.S. 339, 341 (1908).
9. Id.
10. Id. at 342.
11. See id. at 350 (“[T]he copyright statutes . . . do not create the right to
impose, by notice, . . . a limitation at which the book shall be sold at retail by
future purchasers, with whom there is no privity of contract.”).
12. 17 U.S.C. § 41 (1909) (“[N]othing in this Act shall be deemed to forbid,
prevent, or restrict the transfer of any copy of a copyrighted work the possession of
which has been lawfully obtained.”).
13. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2012).
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14

each copy of the work. The 1976 Copyright Act incorporated
15
§ 109 with little change.
The idea that a copy’s rightful owner has the right to freely
16
transfer it has come to be known as the first-sale doctrine. That
doctrine has been in flux: both expanding and contracting over
17
time.
B.

The First-Sale Doctrine’s Expansion

Expansion of the first-sale doctrine has come via both courts
and statutes. One line of cases expanded the first-sale doctrine by
18
limiting copyright owners’ exclusive right to distribute. These socalled “lawfully made” cases involved defendants who legally
purchased copyrighted works abroad, reimporting them for sale
without the copyright holders’ permission. In these cases, the
Supreme Court progressively expanded the interpretation of the
“lawfully made under this title” clause in § 109 to include first
19
goods made in the United States, and then any good produced
20
abroad with the copyright holder’s permission.

14. See 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 8.12[A] (Matthew Bender, rev. ed. 2013) (arguing that the exclusive distribution
right exists primarily to protect copyright owners against the distribution of the
owner’s own copies that have been “stolen or otherwise wrongfully obtained,” and
this protection is unnecessary “where the copyright owner first consents to the sale
or other distribution of copies . . . of his work”).
15. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 79 (1976), (“Section 109(a) restates and
confirms the principle that, where the copyright owner has transferred ownership
of a particular copy or phonorecord of a work, the person to whom the copy or
phonorecord is transferred is entitled to dispose of it by sale, rental, or any other
means.”), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5693.
16. 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 14, § 8.12[B][1].
17. For example, the software industry has become more aggressive in
structuring its transactions with customers as “licenses” or “leases” to avoid selling
a copy and relinquishing control over the distribution right. See, e.g., Vernor v.
Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1111 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that a third-party
eBay seller had no right to resell software purchased from an Autodesk customer
because the initial transaction was a “license” and not a sale).
18. Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1358 (2013);
Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L’anza Research Int’l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 144 (1998).
19. Quality King Distribs., Inc., 523 U.S. at 154 (finding that an importer of
hair care products bearing copyrighted labels obtained overseas was eligible for
the first-sale defense). The Supreme Court emphasized the fact that the exclusive
right to distribute under § 106(3) “is a limited right” and that one of the
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Beyond the courts, Congress has also taken steps to expand
the first-sale doctrine. For example, after the Fourth Circuit held
that an arcade that allowed customers to play imported video
games from Japan violated the copyright holder’s exclusive right to
“publicly perform” the work as embodied in the video games’
21
circuit boards, Congress passed the Computer Software Rental
22
Amendments Act of 1990. That legislation amended § 109 to
allow for the public performance of video game circuit boards
23
without the copyright holder’s permission after a first sale.
C.

The First-Sale Doctrine’s Contraction

Since Bobbs-Merrill, the first-sale doctrine has also been
contracted. For example, the Record Rental Amendment Act of
24
1984 limited the first-sale doctrine’s reach for sound recordings.
The act amended § 109(b) to prohibit the “rental, lease, or
25
lending” of sound recordings, even after a first sale. This
amendment targeted stores that were renting sound recordings as
well as selling blank cassette tapes, all while promising customers
26
that they would “[n]ever, ever buy another record.” Because
copying a sound recording was relatively easy—even if possession
was only temporary—Congress acted to protect the copyright
holder’s exclusive right of reproduction by expanding the exclusive
27
right of distribution and restricting the first-sale doctrine. Six
years later, the Computer Software Rental Amendments Act of
28
1990 extended this concept to software. The legislative history
shows that Congress sought to curtail what was purported to be
limitations is the terms of § 109(a). Id. at 144.
20. Kirtsaeng, 133 S. Ct. at 1358.
21. Red Baron-Franklin Park, Inc. v. Taito Corp., 883 F.2d 275, 281 (4th Cir.
1989) (holding that the first-sale doctrine applies only to distribution, not
performance).
22. Pub. L. No. 101-650, §§ 802–803, 104 Stat. 5134 (codified at 17 U.S.C.
§ 109(b), (e) (2012)).
23. Id. § 803, 104 Stat. at 5135.
24. Pub. L. No. 98-450, 98 Stat. 1727 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 109).
25. Id. § 2, 98 Stat. at 1727.
26. H.R. REP. NO. 98-987, at 2 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2898,
2899.
27. Id. at 1–2, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2898–99.
28. See Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 803, 104 Stat. at 5135 (codified at 17 U.S.C.
§ 109(e)).
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over $1 billion in losses attributed to software piracy. Courts have
read these provisions favorably, interpreting them beyond their
stated purposes, and they sometimes find rental arrangements
30
disguised as deferred-payment plans.
Congress has also limited the first-sale doctrine’s scope to
harmonize with international treaties. To protect a work under the
1976 Copyright Act, an author had to both register his work and
31
provide a copyright notice. If a work was published in the United
States before complying with these formalities, that publication
destroyed any potential copyright protection. These formalities
were unique to the United States, and they ran afoul of the Berne
32
Convention’s requirements for granting copyright protection. As
such, many works created abroad and published by unsophisticated
33
authors fell into the American public domain. The United States
29. S. REP. NO. 101-265, at 3 (1990).
30. See Cent. Point Software, Inc. v. Global Software & Accessories, Inc., 880
F. Supp. 957, 965 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding that a business offering software for
sale at a low price, with a higher deferred payment only due if customer failed to
return the software in five days “operates as a ‘practice in the nature of rental’
under the Act, and, therefore, is prohibited”); see also Adobe Sys., Inc. v.
Brenengen, 928 F. Supp. 616, 618 (E.D.N.C. 1996) (holding that software rental
business that began before the effective date of the 1990 amendment was not
“grandfathered in” and was enjoined from engaging in the rental of software
obtained after 1990).
31. 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 14, § 7.01[A] (“[T]he failure to affix a
copyright notice in proper form and in the proper place on published copies or
phonorecords of a work could prove fatal to copyright in the work.”).
32. See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works
art. 5(2), Sept. 9, 1886, S. TREATY DOC. No 99-27, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 (last amended
Sept. 28, 1979) [hereinafter Berne Convention] (“The enjoyment and the exercise
of these rights shall not be subject to any formality.”). The Berne Convention,
originally signed by ten nations in 1886, is a multilateral agreement to protect
copyright across national boundaries. 5 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER,
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 17.01[B][1] (Matthew Bender, rev. ed. 2013). The
current text of the Berne Convention is the Paris Act, adopted in 1974. Id.
§ 17.01[B][1][a]. The original signatories of the Berne Convention were
Germany, Belgium, Spain, France, the United Kingdom, Haiti, Italy, Switzerland,
Tunisia, and Liberia. Id. § 17.01[B][1][a] n.10.
33. 5 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 32, § 17.01[C][2][b] (citing Hasbro
Bradley, Inc. v. Sparkle Toys, Inc., 780 F.2d 189, 197 (2d Cir. 1985)) (“[T]o cite an
extreme example, in order to enjoy United States copyright protection, a toy
published by a Japanese company in Japan had to bear a copyright notice
complying with Title 17, United States Code, notwithstanding that Japan requires
no copyright notice to secure protection for its works and that, in any event, toys
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34

did not accede to the Berne Convention until 1989, and it was not
until after the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
35
Property Rights (TRIPs) that Congress acted to protect these
36
foreign works.
37
The Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA) granted
copyright protection to works that were protected in their countries
38
of origin but not in the United States. The URAA also created an
exception to the first-sale doctrine by amending § 109 to prevent
selling or transferring copies of works that were newly removed
39
from the public domain. In 2012, the Supreme Court upheld this

are not copyrightable works in Japan.”).
34. See Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568,
§ 2(3), 102 Stat. 2853, 2853 [hereinafter BCIA] (“The amendments made by this
Act, together with the law as it exists on the date of the enactment of this Act,
satisfy the obligations of the United States in adhering to the Berne Convention
and no further rights or interests shall be recognized or created for that
purpose.”).
35. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299.
36. The BCIA explicitly did not handle the question of foreign works that
had fallen into the American public domain due to a failure to follow the
necessary formalities. H.R. REP. NO. 100-609, at 51 (1988) (“The question of
whether and, if so, how Congress might provide retroactive protection to works
now in our public domain raises difficult questions, possibly with constitutional
dimensions. These questions do not have to be addressed now and can be raised if
and when presented in the context of specific facts.”).
37. Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 514, 108 Stat. 4809, 4976–81 (1994) (codified as
amended at 17 U.S.C. § 104A (2012)) (implementing TRIPs).
38. The bill’s intent was to “restore copyright protection to certain foreign
works from countries that are members of the Berne Convention or WTO that
have fallen into the public domain for reasons other than the normal expiration
of their term of protection.” S. REP. NO. 103-412, at 225 (1994); see also 17 U.S.C.
§ 104A(a)(1)(B) (“Any work in which copyright is restored under this section shall
subsist for the remainder of the term of copyright that the work would have
otherwise been granted in the United States if the work never entered the public
domain in the United States.”).
39. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (“Notwithstanding the preceding sentence, copies
or phonorecords of works subject to restored copyright under section 104A that
are manufactured before the date of restoration of copyright or, with respect to
reliance parties, before publication or service of notice under section 104A(e),
may be sold or otherwise disposed of without the authorization of the owner of the
restored copyright for purposes of direct or indirect commercial advantage only
during the 12-month period . . . .”).
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claw back from the public domain—and limitation of the first-sale
40
doctrine.
The first-sale doctrine has also seen contraction through the
courts. Timothy Vernor was an eBay seller who resold copies of
41
Autodesk’s software, AutoCAD Release 14.
The publisher
provided this expensive software package to the original users via a
limited license, which reserved title to Autodesk and restricted the
42
purchaser’s rights to transfer or sell the software. The Ninth
Circuit held that although the original purchasers paid for and
received physical copies of the software, they were not the “owners”
of the copies under § 109, so the first-sale doctrine did not permit
43
Mr. Vernor to resell them again. The Vernor court looked at three
factors: (1) ”whether the copyright owner specifies that a user is
granted a license,” (2) ”whether the copyright owner significantly
restricts the user’s ability to transfer the software,” and
(3) ”whether the copyright owner imposes notable use
44
restrictions.” Since software and other digital products are
increasingly sold with restrictive license terms, the secondary
market is limited.
Other courts have taken contrasting approaches to the
question of “ownership.” The Second Circuit, in determining
whether someone possessing a copy of computer software was an
45
owner under § 117(a), held that multiple factors determine
46
ownership; formal title is just one. In contrast, the Court of Justice
40. See Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 884 (2012) (holding that Congress
indeed had the power to pull works that had been in the U.S. public domain back
under copyright protection, when this protection was required in order to satisfy
American obligations under the Berne Convention).
41. Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1103 (9th Cir. 2010).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1103–04.
44. Id. at 1110–11.
45. 17 U.S.C. § 117(a) (2012) (stating that “it is not an infringement for the
owner of a copy of a computer program to make or authorize the making of
another copy or adaptation of that computer program,” provided that the making
of the copy is an essential step in using the software or the copy is made for
archival purposes).
46. Krause v. Titleserv, Inc., 402 F.3d 119, 124 (2d Cir. 2005) (“We conclude
for these reasons that formal title in a program copy is not an absolute
prerequisite to qualifying for § 117(a)’s affirmative defense. Instead, courts should
inquire into whether the party exercises sufficient incidents of ownership over a
copy of the program to be sensibly considered the owner of the copy for purposes
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of the European Union (“EU Court of Justice”) looked beyond the
four corners of the license between the copyright holder and the
original purchaser, inferring that the transaction was an actual
47
sale. In that case, the EU Court of Justice held that the sale
constituted an exhaustion of the copyright holder’s distribution
48
right. To find the sale, the EU Court of Justice looked at the terms
of the original transaction: a one-time fee to use the software for an
49
unlimited period. The EU Court of Justice contrasted those terms
of sale with terms of a mere rental, holding that the copyright
50
owner’s distribution right had been exhausted.
III. PURE DIGITAL CONTENT MAY BE DIFFERENT
The transfer from analog content to digital content is more
than just a shift in delivery mechanisms. In the analog world of
Bobbs-Merrill, after a copyrighted work’s initial sale, publishers’
concerns were limited. Unauthorized copying could occur, but the
Copyright Act expressly prohibited it; further, those publishers
51
could track and stop large-scale operations of mass copying. Even
after the first-sale doctrine’s establishment, publishers had little to
fear from a secondary market that was tempered by physical goods’
scarcity and degradation. Used book purchases are only possible
of § 117(a). The presence or absence of formal title may of course be a factor in
this inquiry, but the absence of formal title may be outweighed by evidence that
the possessor of the copy enjoys sufficiently broad rights over it to be sensibly
considered its owner.”); see also DSC Commc’ns Corp. v. Pulse Commc’ns, Inc.,
170 F.3d 1354, 1360–61 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[A] party who purchases copies of
software from the copyright owner can hold a license under a copyright while still
being an ‘owner’ of a copy of the copyrighted software for purposes of section
117.”).
47. Case C-128/11, UsedSoft GmbH v. Oracle Int’l Corp., 2012 EURLex 62011CJ0128 (July 3, 2012), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/celex.jsf?celex=
62011CJ0128&lang1=en&type=NOT&ancre=.
48. Id. ¶ 72.
49. Id. ¶ 59.
50. Id. ¶ 88 (holding the copyright holder may retain distribution rights
where the software could only be used for a limited period of time).
51. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, DMCA SECTION 104 REPORT 20 (2001)
[hereinafter DMCA REPORT], available at http://www.copyright.gov/reports
/studies/dmca/sec-104-report-vol-1.pdf (mentioning that the Bobbs-Merrill court
“noted, as a matter of statutory construction, that the reproduction right was the
‘main purpose’ of the copyright law, and the right to vend existed to give effect to
the reproduction right”).
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because someone originally purchased the book, so the number of
copies are limited by the extent of the publisher’s primary sales.
Further, all physical books eventually degrade through use or time.
In addition, the burden of physically transporting books can create
a barrier to secondary sales. Therefore, consumers often have an
incentive to obtain a new copy of a physical good, even if they must
pay a premium.
In contrast, digital content publishers release their goods into
a stream of commerce that is far more risky: making copies
(legitimate or otherwise) and instantaneously transporting them
52
anywhere in the world is trivially easy. Such infinite reproducibility
creates a number of problems for publishers. Foremost among
these is piracy: the unauthorized copying and distribution of purely
digital goods—or physical goods (e.g., CDs, DVDs) that can be
converted into a digital format. Piracy is an existential threat to the
media and software industries, and copyright holders have taken a
number of approaches to combat it: from public awareness
53
54
55
campaigns, to legal action, to legislative changes, to technical
56
solutions such as digital rights management (DRM).

52. Id. at 82.
53. See Nat’l Intellectual Prop. Rights Coordination Ctr., U.S. Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., Antipiracy PSA (Update), YOUTUBE (June 9, 2011), http://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=6YScoXn31Mg; Report Software Piracy Now!, BSA:
SOFTWARE ALLIANCE, https://reporting.bsa.org/r/report/add.aspx?src=us&ln=en
-us (last visited Oct. 7, 2013). For a news release on the launch of the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security YouTube video campaign, see News Release,
U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, New Public Service Announcement
Launched to Raise Intellectual Property Theft Awareness, (Apr. 26, 2011),
http://www.ice.gov/news/releases/1104/110426washingtondc.htm.
54. See, e.g., MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 936–37 (2005)
(holding that “one who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to
infringe copyright . . . is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third
parties”); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1021–22 (9th Cir.
2001) (holding that a file-sharing service could be held liable for indirect
infringement of plaintiff’s copyrights when it knew of specific infringing material
being transferred and did not exercise its power to block it).
55. See, e.g., Computer Software Rental Amendments Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-650, § 802, 104 Stat. 5134, 5134–35 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 109(b) (2012));
Record Rental Amendment of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-450, § 2, 98 Stat. 1727, 1727
(codified at 17 U.S.C. § 109).
56. See infra Part IV.
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Even if piracy were not an issue, expanding the first-sale
doctrine to cover digital goods is problematic. Part of the problem
lies in the policy reasons behind the first-sale doctrine’s
development. When considering whether to apply the first-sale
doctrine to digital goods, the U.S. Copyright Office explained that
the doctrine began as “an outgrowth of the distinction between
ownership of intangible intellectual property (the copyright) and
57
ownership of tangible personal property (the copy).” The first-sale
doctrine arises out of a desire to avoid restraining the owner of the
58
tangible property from alienating it as he or she chooses. As such,
the doctrine limits the copyright holder’s exclusive right of
distribution. But when digital goods are transferred or used, it
results in a new copy—which may implicate the owner’s exclusive
59
right of reproduction. The first-sale doctrine, in contrast, is silent as
to reproduction. When considering the viability of a potential
digital first-sale doctrine, that distinction is significant.
In addition to the legal issue, permitting sales of digital
content would also likely affect the marketplace. For example, a
secondary market for digital goods would likely depress prices for
new sales. Unlike relatively fragile physical works—such as a
scratched CD or a dog-eared and highlighted textbook—used
digital goods and their new counterparts are indistinguishable. As
such, copyright owners worried about digital first sale might ask:
60
“Why would anyone buy a new copy?” For example, the first
purchaser might buy an e-book for $10. Then that purchaser might
sell it to another for $9. After several iterations and some time, the
price may well shrink to $0.01. To the new purchaser, that one cent
copy and the ten dollar copy would be identical. So what consumer
would want to be the first to pay a $10 premium when a patient
61
consumer could pay only $0.01 for an identical copy?

57. DMCA REPORT, supra note 51, at 86.
58. Id.
59. This might be true even if, as in ReDigi, the technology deletes the
original copy during the new copy’s creation. See infra notes 93−97 and
accompanying text.
60. See David Pogue, Reselling E-Books and the One-Penny Problem, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 14, 2013, 3:11 PM), http://pogue.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/03/14/reselling
-e-books-and-the-one-penny-problem.
61. See id.
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This concern might elicit two responses. First, a digital
secondary market may still contain scarcity. Although some
consumers will wait, seeking a discount, some consumers will always
be willing to pay full price in order to obtain media around its
release date. Presuming that copyrighted content cannot be freely
62
copied, sales to primary purchasers will define the secondary
market’s scope. If few (or no) primary purchasers buy the work,
then that scarcity would limit the secondary market. This scenario
could result in content owners charging primary purchasers with a
high premium—essentially a tax for being first.
This arrangement currently exists, to some degree, in the highend “AAA” video-game market. Producing AAA games is expensive.
63
Some titles’ production costs are in the tens of millions of dollars.
Sold new, each game’s retail cost is more than sixty dollars. But
within the first few weeks of a new title’s release, video game
resellers frequently permit those primary purchasers to return
64
those new titles for significant in-store credits. Under this
arrangement, the “early bird” consumers know that although they
may spend more initially, they will be able to recoup some of that
expenditure upon trade-in. As such, the video-game industry’s
healthy secondary market presumably supports—at least in part—
the launch date’s premium prices.
Second, copyright owners have almost always had concerns
about secondary markets, but their worst worries have largely failed
to materialize. From the turn of the twentieth century and beyond,
book publishers have been concerned about the used book
65
market’s effect on new book profits. And near the end of the

62. This presumption is, of course, largely academic.
63. Colin Campbell, Are AAA Hardcore Games Doomed? An In-depth Look
at the Future of Big-Budget, Blockbuster Video Games, IGN (July 30, 2012), http://www
.ign.com/articles/2012/07/30/are-aaa-hardcore-games-doomed (noting that the
budget for Rockstar Games’ 2012 release Max Payne 3 was estimated to be over
$100 million).
64. For example, at the time of this writing, the first-person shooter game
The Last of Us was being offered as new for $59.99, The Last of Us for
Playstation 3, GAMESTOP, http://www.gamestop.com/ps3/games/the-last-of
-us/98630 (last visited Nov. 25, 2013), while the same retailer was offering $32.50
for that title as a trade-in. For a list of the current trade value for select games, see
Featured Trade Values, GAMESTOP, http://www.gamestop.com/trade-values (last
visited Dec. 5, 2013).
65. The “net price” printed on the copies of The Castaway at issue in Bobbs-
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twentieth century, one of the biggest-selling musicians in history,
66
Garth Brooks, used his clout in an attempt to curb used CD sales.
State statutes have also flirted with the idea of curbing sales of used
67
CDs and DVDs. But even with robust secondary markets, both the
publishing and music industries survived and thrived—reaping
68
billions in revenue. Much of this success can be attributed to an
increase in the sales of digital goods. In 2011 the music industry
69
reported revenues of $5.2 billion in worldwide digital sales alone.
Similarly, the publishing industry has reported e-book revenues of
70
over $3 billion. Concerns about a potential digital first-sale
doctrine might be overblown—unless, of course, this time really is
different.
IV. THE RISE AND WEAKNESSES OF DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT
If the digital first-sale doctrine were to become a reality,
copyright holders may well seek the protection of technological
measures. For example, copyright holders facing the digital
Merrill was part of the American Publishers’ Association’s plan to “correct evils
connected with the cutting of prices on copyright books.” Bobbs-Merrill Co. v.
Straus, 139 F. 155, 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1905).
66. Michael A. Barber, He’s True to the Issue and Fans Are True to Him, SEATTLE
POST-INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 4, 1993, at C1, available at 1993 WLNR 1529281.
67. For example, Florida’s Secondhand Articles and Dealers Statute requires
dealers of used goods to record detailed transaction information, including
thumbprints, from individuals bringing in said goods for sale. FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 538.04(1)(c) (West, Westlaw through 2013 1st Reg. Sess.). In 2006, it was
amended to include a broad range of copyrightable goods including used CDs and
DVDs in the definition of “secondhand goods.” Act of June 13, 2006, ch. 2006-201,
§ 1, 2006 Fla. Laws 2190, 2191–92 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 538.03(f)).
68. Despite drops through much of the 21st century, the music industry
reported revenue of $16.5 billion in 2012. Eric Pfanner, Music Industry Sales Rise,
and Digital Revenue Gets the Credit, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2013, at B3, available at 2013
WLNR 4882671. Book sales brought in $27.12 billion in 2012. Jim Milliot,
Trade Sales Rose 6.9% in 2012, PUBLISHERS WKLY. (May 15, 2013), http://
www.publishersweekly.com/pw/by-topic/industry-news/financial-reporting/article
/57242-trade-sales-rose-6-9-in-2012.html.
69. INT’L FED’N OF THE PHONOGRAPHIC INDUS., DIGITAL MUSIC REPORT 2012, at
6–7 (2012), available at http://www.ifpi.org/content/library/dmr2012.pdf.
70. Laura Hazard Owen, PwC: The U.S. Consumer Ebook Market Will Be Bigger
Than the Print Book Market by 2017, PAIDCONTENT (June 4, 2013, 7:01 PM),
http://paidcontent.org/2013/06/04/pwc-the-u-s-consumer-ebook-market-will-be
-bigger-than-the-print-book-market-by-2017/.
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content challenges have previously employed technological
solutions in attempts to replicate some of physical media’s
limitations. The technological category that controls access and use
of digital goods is known generally as digital rights management
71
(DRM). Content owners have employed DRM for many purposes,
72
including preventing unauthorized copying, restricting access
73
based on the playback-device manufacturer, or restricting by
74
geographic region. Like all technologies, DRM schemes are
vulnerable to attack by persons and groups who are motivated to
circumvent them. This has led to a cat-and-mouse scenario in which
copyright holders constantly strive to develop newer DRM
technologies that can temporarily delay their nearly inevitable
75
cracking.
Because of DRM’s technical vulnerabilities, copyright owners
must couple their DRM with legal enforcement that will legally
prevent consumers from using widely available DRM-circumvention
tools. In the United States, copyright holders obtained this legal
71. Dan L. Burk, Legal and Technical Standards in Digital Rights Management
Technology, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 537, 538–39 (2005) (noting that DRM “simulate[s]
the natural appropriability resistance of physical goods,” when DRM controls
“prohibit or constrain the copying and distribution that digital formats invite . . .
essentially transforming public goods back into private goods”).
72. See, e.g., United States v. Elcom Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1118 (N.D.
Cal. 2002) (“For example, [using the Adobe Content Server software] the ebook
publisher may choose whether the consumer will be able to copy the ebook,
whether the ebook can be printed to paper (in whole, in part, or not at all),
whether the ‘lending function’ is enabled to allow the user to lend the ebook to
another computer on the same network of computers, and whether to permit the
ebook to be read audibly by a speech synthesizer program.”).
73. See, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294,
303 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (“CSS-protected motion pictures on DVDs may be viewed only
on players and computer drives equipped with licensed technology that permits
the devices to decrypt and play—but not to copy—the films.”), aff’d sub nom.
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001).
74. Burk, supra note 71, at 562 (“Machines manufactured in different
geographic areas were designed to allow access to the content of a given DVD only
if the disc was coded to be played in that corresponding geographic area, thus
allowing significant control over the timing and distribution of movies released in
different parts of the globe.”).
75. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 343 (“Defendants are in the business of
disseminating information to assist hackers in ‘cracking’ various types of
technological security systems. . . . In consequence, the Court finds that there is a
substantial likelihood of future violations absent injunctive relief.”).
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enforcement mechanism under the Digital Millennium Copyright
76
77
Act (DMCA). The DMCA implements the World Intellectual
Property Organization Copyright Treaty (“WIPO Treaty”), article
11 of which states:
Contracting Parties shall provide adequate legal
protection and effective legal remedies against the
circumvention of effective technological measures that
are used by authors in connection with the exercise of
their rights under this Treaty or the Berne Convention
and that restrict acts, in respect of their works, which are
not authorized by the authors concerned or permitted by
78
law.
The DMCA’s anti-circumvention provision, codified in the
79
Copyright Act, distinguishes technological controls preventing
unauthorized access and those preventing unauthorized uses (i.e.,
those implicating copyright holders’ exclusive rights under § 106).
To accommodate fair use and other exemptions to copyright
infringement, the DMCA seeks to prevent only circumvention of
80
those measures designed to prevent access. Specifically, § 1201(a)
states that “[n]o person shall circumvent a technological measure
that effectively controls access to a work protected under this
81
title.” But § 1201(b) still prohibits creating or distributing devices
that are primarily designed to allow circumventing copy-control
82
schemes that protect rights under § 106. In practice, however,
83
access-control and copy-control measures are effectively identical.

76. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
77. S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 1–2 (1998).
78. World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty art. 11, Dec.
20, 1996, S. TREATY DOC. No. 105-17, 2186 U.N.T.S. 121.
79. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2012).
80. DMCA REPORT, supra note 51, at 11.
81. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A).
82. Id. § 1201(b)(1) (“No person shall manufacture . . . or otherwise traffic
in any technology . . . that is primarily designed or produced for the purpose of
circumventing protection afforded by a technological measure that effectively
protects a right of a copyright owner under this title . . . .”).
83. Burk, supra note 71, at 559 (citing 321 Studios v. Metro Goldwyn Mayer
Studios, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1095 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (classifying CSS as “a
technological measure that both effectively controls access to DVDs and effectively
protects the right of a copyright holder”)).
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This—coupled with the few exceptions permitting research,
85
86
archival, and fair-use circumventions—has prompted some
commentators to argue that the DMCA goes far beyond anything
87
required by the WIPO Treaty’s anti-circumvention provisions.
Shielded by the DMCA, copyright holders have implemented
DRM schemes that seek to curtail piracy and control how
consumers use digital goods. In response, consumers have
88
complained that these schemes bring problems of overreach,
89
90
intrusiveness, and obsolescence.
Some consumers express their concern that DRM inhibits fair
91
use. The DMCA states that it is not intended to affect “defenses to

84. 17 U.S.C. § 108.
85. Id.
86. Id. § 107.
87. See, e.g., Burke, supra note 71, at 558 (“In the United States, such
protection would already have been provided under the doctrine of contributory
infringement, which attributes copyright liability to providers of technical devices
that lack a substantial noninfringing use.”); Anupam Chander, Exporting DMCA
Lockouts, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 205, 210–11 (2006) (touting reasonable exemptions
in both European and Australian implementations of the WIPO Treaty).
88. E.g., Jeremy Gallman, Microsoft Kills Overreaching XBOX One DRM Policies,
TECHTAINIAN (June 20, 2013, 12:52 PM), http://techtainian.com/news/2013/6
/20/microsoft-kills-overreaching-xbox-one-drm-policies; Blake Snow, EA Admits to
Overreaching DRM in Spore, Gamers Still Upset, MACWORLD (Sept. 25, 2008, 4:09 AM),
http://www.macworld.com/article/1135733/spore.html.
89. Letter from Jennifer Stoddart, Privacy Comm’r of Can., to Jim Prentice,
Minister of Indus., and Josée Verner, Minister of Canadian Heritage, Letter with
Respect to Possible Amendments to the Copyright Act (Jan. 18, 2008), available at
http://www.priv.gc.ca/parl/2008/let_080118_e.asp (“DRM technologies can also
collect detailed personal information from users, who often do no more than
access the content on a computer. . . . That this occurs when individuals are
engaged in a private activity in their homes or other places where they have a high
expectation of privacy exacerbates the intrusiveness of the collection.”).
90. See 37 CFR § 201.40 (2012) (permitting circumvention of DRM that is
obsolete); see 30 Days of DRM—Day 17: Broken or Obsolete Technology (Circumvention
Rights), MICHAEL GEIST (Sept. 4, 2006), http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view
/1408/195/.
91. E.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 304
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (“[Defendants] argue that those who would make fair use of
technologically protected [DRM] copyrighted works need means, such as DeCSS,
of circumventing access control measures not for piracy, but to make lawful use of
those works.”), aff’d sub nom. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429
(2d Cir. 2001).
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92

copyright infringement, including fair use” —though at least one
commentator has noted that “there is no such thing as a section
93
107 fair use defense to a charge of a section 1201 violation.”
Courts have rejected the notion that fair use is a potential
“commercially significant purpose” that would qualify as a
94
circumvention measure (an exemption to § 1201). Essentially,
courts have taken the position that fair use is permitted, but
creating and disseminating technology that facilitates fair use (by
circumventing DRM) is not. In practice, some consumers argue
that the interplay between DRM and the DMCA allows copyright
holders to implement technological measures that curtail
consumers’ fair use beyond what copyright law would otherwise
95
permit.
Consumers argue that many DRM schemes have been highly
intrusive—especially those intended to control how users interact
with digital media on their personal computers. For example,
between 2005 and 2007, Sony BMG distributed millions of music
96
CDs containing Extended Copy Protection (XCP). Although
XCP’s ostensible purpose was preventing unauthorized uses
97
(e.g., copying), XCP also curtailed valid uses (e.g., listening). For
92. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c) (2012).
93. David Nimmer, A Riff on Fair Use in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act,
148 U. PA. L. REV. 673, 723 (2000).
94. See, e.g., Corley, 273 F.3d at 459 (“Fair use has never been held to be a
guarantee of access to copyrighted material in order to copy it by the fair user’s
preferred technique or in the format of the original.”); United States v. Elcom
Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1135 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (acknowledging that the DMCA
“impacts a lawful purchaser’s ‘right’ to make a back-up copy, or to space-shift that
copy to another computer,” but finding that this limited impairment of a fair use
right is not so overbroad as to render the DMCA unconstitutional).
95. E.g., Pamela Samuelson, DRM {and, or, vs.} the Law, 46 COMM. ACM, Apr.
2003, at 41, 42, available at http://people.ischool.berkeley.edu/~pam/papers/acm
_v46_p41.pdf (“While DRM systems can certainly prevent illegal copying and
public distribution of copyrighted works, they can do far more . . . , thus exceeding
copyright’s bounds.”).
96. Cf. Sony Faces Slew of Lawsuits Over Digital-Rights Software: Guevara v. Sony
BMG Music Entm’t, 23 ANDREWS COMPUTER & INTERNET LITIG. REP., Dec. 1, 2005, at
2 [hereinafter Sony Faces Slew of Lawsuits], available at 2005 WL 3197656
(summarizing the seven DRM lawsuits filed against Sony in 2005).
97. Complaint at 55, 94, Hull v. Sony BMG Music Entm’t Corp.,
No. BC343385 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 21, 2005), 2005 WL 3142873 (commencing
one of several Electronic Frontier Foundation-sponsored cases against Sony BMG
regarding the XCP “rootkit”).
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example, users attempting to listen on certain computer
configurations were unable to do so. In addition, XCP was
sometimes installed without the user’s knowledge or permission;
further, it contained security flaws that exposed consumers’
98
computers to malware or hacking. XCP’s insecurity led the
technology community to disparagingly refer to it as “the Sony
99
rootkit.” Notably, the only consumers adversely affected by XCP
were those who purchased the CD legally. Illegal copies likely
stripped the copy-protection software.
Another perceived weakness in DRM schemes is the risk of the
digital media container’s premature obsolescence. Many DRM
schemes require the computer or device that plays or displays the
digital media to “call home”—ensuring that the consumer’s
proposed use of the media is authorized. That arrangement works
reasonably well, so long as (1) the consumer can access the
Internet and (2) the DRM servers remain available. In DRM’s short
history, however, a number of companies chose to shut down the
DRM servers when maintaining them was no longer commercially
100
advantageous. In such cases, lawful purchasers are frequently left
101
unable to access or use their digital goods.
All of these perceived weaknesses may make DRM an
unpalatable option for certain content. For example, the music
consumers who were used to freely copying music to multiple
devices—permitted by DRM-free MP3s—became frustrated with the
102
DRM-shackled services such as iTunes. As a result, and bolstered
98. Sony Faces Slew of Lawsuits, supra note 96, at 2.
99. Complaint, supra note 97, at 54, 61, 63, 65, 70; cf. Randal C. Picker,
Mistrust-Based Digital Rights Management, 5 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 47, 58
(2006) (noting that once executed, the XCP “can block normal copying of the CD
and can impose an end-user license agreement that limits access by the computer
to the CD”).
100. E.g., Digital Rights Management—Obsolescence, MGMT-SURVIVAL.COM
(Nov. 26, 2013), http://management-survival.com/digital-rights-management
-obsolescence/ (providing several examples of companies ceasing DRM support).
101. For example, in 2006 Amazon ceased support for PDF and LIT format eBooks with DRM, and users who had previously purchased books in those formats
could no longer access the books on new devices. Digital Rights
Management, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_rights_management
#Obsolescence (last visited Oct. 11, 2013).
102. Matthew Ingram, Why Apple’s iTunes Concessions Are a Double-Edged Sword,
GIGAOM (Jan. 6, 2009, 7:05 PM), http://gigaom.com/2009/01/06/why-apples
-itunes-concessions-are-a-double-edged-sword/ (noting Apple’s shift to DRM-free
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by competition from MP3 stores like Amazon and eMusic, Apple
103
and the music industry removed DRM from its music downloads.
Today, music sales are nearly universally DRM free. In contrast,
however, e-books and movies nearly always contain DRM. To date,
consumers have not shown the same distaste for DRM in those
media, and brisk sales of e-books, in particular, likely encourages
publishers to stay the DRM course. Some have argued that DRM
104
keeps honest people honest—preventing devolution into piracy.
But if a digital first-sale doctrine develops, that may well require
breaking DRM.
V. HOW COULD DIGITAL FIRST SALE HAPPEN?
A.

Courts

As with many new technological developments, the initial test
ground for the digital first-sale doctrine has been the courts. But as
much as consumers may want it, U.S. courts are unlikely to extend
the first-sale doctrine to digital goods. A recent test case for digital
first sale—involving questions of ownership, copying, and efficacy
105
of technological measures—is Capitol Records, L.L.C. v. ReDigi Inc.
Recognizing the untapped economic potential for a secondary
market in digital goods, ReDigi developed technology that allowed
users to sell their copies of digital music, while striving to ensure
106
that only one copy existed at a time. Capitol Records disagreed
with ReDigi’s factual assertions about the technology, arguing that
regardless of whether a “transfer” incorporated a bit-by-bit transfer
of the original file, the process created a new copy—an act that
music); Janko Roettgers, Apple’s iCloud Punishes Honest iTunes Users with DRM,
GIGAOM (June 8, 2011, 11:24 AM), http://gigaom.com/2011/06/08/apple-icloud
-drm/.
103. See Ingram, supra note 102 (“Amazon (among others) has had DRM-free
songs from the four major record labels available in its online store for almost a
year now.”).
104. Digital Film: Industry Answers, B.B.C. (Feb. 9, 2006), http://news.bbc.co
.uk/2/hi/entertainment/4691232.stm (“Without the use of DRMs, honest
consumers would have no guidelines and might eventually come to totally
disregard copyright and therefore become a pirate, resulting in great harm to
content creators.” (quoting Dan Glickman, Motion Picture Association of
America)).
105. 934 F. Supp. 2d 640 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
106. Id. at 645–46.
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107

violated Capitol’s exclusive right of reproduction. The Southern
108
District of New York agreed with Capitol’s reasoning,
distinguishing the copyrighted work (the sound recording in the
form of a digital music file) from the “material object” to which it
was affixed (the phonorecord, or here, the hard disk’s written-to
109
segment). Addressing concerns about the limitation to the firstsale defense, the court contended that § 109(a) still applied to
digital goods because the owners—at the time of purchase—could
still sell or trade the actual device to which those digital copies were
110
downloaded. This suggestion that consumers simply enable a
secondary market by the selling and trading of iPods and hard
111
drives has come under criticism for its impracticality. Given the
112
Ninth Circuit’s favorable view of license terms that restrict resale
and the ongoing distinction between the reproduction and
distribution rights, ReDigi faces steep odds on appeal.
In contrast, the EU Court of Justice has held that regardless of
parties’ contractual terms, a digital “sale” falls under the first-sale
113
doctrine—so long as the license looks sufficiently like a sale. For
107. Id.
108. Id. at 648 (“[T]he plain text of the Copyright Act makes clear that
reproduction occurs when a copyrighted work is fixed in a new material object.”);
see also id. at 650 (“[I]t is the creation of a new material object and not an additional
material object that defines the reproduction right.”).
109. Id. at 649 (citing London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe 1, 542 F. Supp. 2d
153, 166 & n.16, 171 (D. Mass. 2008)).
110. Id. at 656 (“Section 109(a) still protects a lawful owner’s sale of her
‘particular’ phonorecord, be it a computer hard disk, iPod, or other memory
device onto which the file was originally downloaded.”).
111. See, e.g., Mike Masnick, ReDigi Loses: You Can’t Resell Your MP3s (Unless
You Sell Your Whole Hard Drive), TECHDIRT (Apr. 1, 2013, 12:01 PM), http://
www.techdirt.com/articles/20130401/11341622538/redigi-loses-selling-used-mp3s
-online-infringes-first-sale-doesnt-apply-to-digital-transfers.shtml (calling the ruling
“obviously nutty”).
112. See Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2010); see also F.B.T.
Prods., L.L.C. v. Aftermath Records, 621 F.3d 958, 965 (9th Cir. 2010) (describing
the factors to be examined in determining if a transaction is a license: “[I]t is well
settled that where a copyright owner transfers a copy of copyrighted material,
retains title, limits the uses to which the material may be put, and is compensated
periodically based on the transferee’s exploitation of the material, the transaction
is a license.”).
113. See Case C-128/11, UsedSoft GmbH v. Oracle Int’l Corp., 2012 EUR-Lex
CELEX 62011CJ0128 (July 3, 2012), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/celex.jsf?celex=
62011CJ0128&lang1=en&type=NOT&ancre=.
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example, the EU Court of Justice held that if a license lacks any
limitations on time or ownership, then the initial owner may
114
alienate ownership (through subsequent sales, gifts, etc.). This
EU development adds an incentive for copyright holders and
publishers to restrict their license terms, which will likely drive
down prices as consumers may balk at the limited nature of the
“sale.” That work-around may also serve as an additional reason
that U.S. courts are unlikely to adopt a digital first-sale doctrine—
without congressional policy-weighing deliberations.
B.

Legislation

An obvious way to create a right to digital first sale would be to
amend § 109. In 1997, Representatives Dick Boucher (D-VA) and
Tom Campbell (R-CA) introduced a bill that sought to do just that:
115
(“Boucherthe Digital Era Copyright Enhancement Act
Campbell”).
The authorization for use set forth in subsection
(a) applies where the owner of a particular copy or
phonorecord in a digital format lawfully made under this
title, or any person authorized by such owner, performs,
displays or distributes the work by means of transmission
to a single recipient, if that person erases or destroys his
or her copy or phonorecord at substantially the same
time. The reproduction of the work, to the extent
necessary for such performance, display, distribution, is
116
not an infringement.
After its introduction, Boucher-Campbell did not pass; in many
117
ways, it was superseded by the DMCA. One concern was the bill’s
extension of the first-sale doctrine to allow for reproduction, as well
as distribution—since digital goods cannot be transferred without
118
creating a new copy. But more than fifteen years after BoucherCampbell, when so much of our media and software markets
involve digital goods, Congress might consider modifying the
distinction between reproduction and distribution, given that all of
114. Id.
115. H.R. 3048, 105th Cong. § 4 (1997).
116. Id.
117. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860
(1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
118. DMCA REPORT, supra note 51, at 47.
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digital goods’ distribution also involves reproduction. Such an
amendment would also guide courts that need to determine when
119
a new digital copy is an infringing copy. In the digital age, the
concept of a purchaser’s “master” copy is largely anachronistic. Just
because a consumer originally downloads an iTunes song to a
computer, that consumer should not be required to keep that
particular computer forever—merely to retain the consumer’s
rights to possess and listen to that song.
Another way for Congress to establish a digital first-sale
doctrine would be to regulate license agreements concerning
copyrights. The law could create an implied right to resell or
transfer the ownership of individual digital files, user accounts, or
both. Such an implied right would likely mitigate the problem of
assets being lost, upon the user’s death.
C.

Marketplace

Although legislation or judicial decisions may be the most
sweeping means to establish a digital first-sale doctrine, the best
hope for a secondary market in digital goods may well be the
marketplace. When Apple launched iTunes, its deals with record
companies required that songs include DRM. Because iTunes’s
introduction slowed (and potentially reversed) the record
industry’s apparent free fall, many have viewed iTunes as the music
industry’s savior. But after a few years, music companies became
less enamored with Apple’s dominant position and its resultant
effect on pricing, so the record industry diversified—permitting
music to be sold through other services, such as Amazon, Google,
120
eMusic, and others. To make those distribution outlets attractive
119. See Capitol Records, L.L.C. v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 649–50
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“Because the reproduction right is necessarily implicated when a
copyrighted work is embodied in a new material object, and because digital music
files must be embodied in a new material object following their transfer over the
Internet, the Court determines that the embodiment of a digital music file on a
new hard disk is a reproduction within the meaning of the Copyright Act.”). But if
the ReDigi rule became widespread, users could never transfer music to an iPod or
iPhone (since that requires transfer to a “new hard disk”). And when a user’s
computer hard drive dies, the user’s right to listen to the downloaded music would
die with it.
120. E.g., Greg Sandoval, Amazon Exec Slams Some in Music Sector, CNET
(Apr. 11, 2010, 6:28 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-31001_3-20002223-261.html
(“Whether or not Amazon’s price cutting was done with the labels’ blessing, what
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alternatives to iTunes, the music companies permitted the other
services to sell music without DRM—largely in unlocked MP3
121
files. In 2009, with the digital-music distribution marketplace
more diversified, Apple and the record companies renegotiated
122
their licenses to offer Apple’s entire catalog DRM free.
Now, the digital marketplace’s 800-pound gorillas may be
poised to do a similar metamorphosis for digital first sale. Apple
has filed a patent application concerning secondary sales of digital
123
goods. And the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office has already
124
Both companies have
granted such a patent to Amazon.
prosecuted these patents despite the current lack of any legal
ability to resell digital goods. Of course, just because a patent is
filed or granted does not make the underlying technology legal.
But the filings do indicate that both companies realize that, as
digital content’s largest distributors, they have great power to
influence (or create) a secondary market.
Amazon is arguably the world’s largest content distributor—
analog and digital alike—so its business choices in this sector carry
great weight. Amazon already permits its users to lend certain
125
e-books between friends, but the system permits such lending
only if a publisher grants its permission. Under Amazon’s patent,
granted in January 2013, the company has foreshadowed its
apparent plans to expand that service. The patent claims a system
is certain is that the record industry wanted another strong player in digital music
to help counter Apple’s enormous power.”).
121. Id. (“[E]ver since Amazon launched its MP3 music store in September
2007, the labels have acted as if they appeared to favor the service. In January
2008, Amazon became the first music store to sell tunes from the major labels free
of digital rights management software.”).
122. Dana P. Jozefczyk, Note, The Poison Fruit: Has Apple Finally Sown the Seed of
Its Own Destruction?, 7 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 369, 387 (2009).
123. U.S. Patent Application No. 13/531,280 (filed June 22, 2012)
(publication number 20130060616).
124. U.S. Patent No. 8,364,595 (filed May 5, 2009) (issued Jan. 29, 2013).
125. Marcus Wohlsen, Amazon Wants to Get into the Used E-Book Business—
Or Bury It, WIRED (Feb. 8, 2013, 6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/business/2013
/02/amazon-used-e-book-patent/ (“Currently if a publisher grants Amazon the
rights, when a Kindle customer ‘buys’ a book, they have the option to loan the
access rights to that digital file to friends or family that are also Kindle users. While
the book is on loan, the original owner of the book is unable to access the e-book
on any Kindle device. It’s still on those devices, but the access rights to the book
have been transferred temporarily to the person with the loaned e-book.”).
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in which each user has a personalized data store, which contains
126
that user’s various purchased media. Users can access the media
in their stores via moving, streaming, or downloading. When a user
no longer wishes to access a piece of media, that user can transfer
those media rights to another user, and the original user’s access to
the media will be restricted or eliminated. In an apparent nod to
copyright holders, the claimed system supports limiting how often a
digital object can be moved or transferred, based on business rules
127
(which would likely be tied to license agreements).
These
transfer limits apparently seek to preserve some semblance of
scarcity inherent in physical secondary markets—mimicking the
way that physical objects degrade over time, after passing through
several hands. Although Amazon’s patent may hint at that
company’s plans to establish a full-fledged digital market, some
have speculated that the company may leverage its patent to prevent
128
such a market from being established. For example, some have
129
may
argued that certain functions of ReDigi’s marketplace
130
overlap with Amazon’s claim 1.
Shortly after Amazon received its patent, Apple also applied
131
for a patent regarding the digital secondary market. Apple’s
system is similar to Amazon’s, though Apple adds a mechanism to
revert a portion of the sale proceeds to the digital marketplace, the
132
copyright holder, or both. This functionality is a likely ploy
seeking copyright holders’ agreement to a secondary-market
scheme by providing them with a cut of the fees from future sales.
Copyright holders have justifiable concerns about the infinite reuse
and resale of digital goods, so such residual payments would

126. ‘595 Patent, claim 1.
127. Id., claim 2.
128. Wohlsen, supra note 125 (“I would not leap to the conclusion that the
fact that they have this patent means that they intend to go into this business, . . .
[t]hey may be patenting it to keep it off the market.”).
129. See Capitol Records, L.L.C. v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 644–46
(S.D.N.Y. 2013).
130. E.g., Eriq Gardner, Amazon Gains Patent on Market for ‘Used’ Digital Movies,
Songs, Books, HOLLYWOOD REP. (Feb. 6, 2013, 4:20 PM), http://www
.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/amazon-gains-patent-market-used-418909.
131. See U.S. Patent Application No. 13/531,280 (filed June 12, 2012).
132. Id. ¶ [0007] (“In some embodiments, the online store and/or the
publisher of the digital content item may receive a portion of the proceeds of the
transfer.”).
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provide copyright holders with a new revenue stream. ReDigi,
which has regrouped and is planning to begin selling used e-books
in the near future, also supports giving artists and copyright
133
holders portions of residual sales.
These potential services contain a common theme: rather than
relying upon consumers’ first-sale rights or true “ownership” of the
digital media—or an attempt to modify copyright law—the
initiatives instead focus on negotiating with copyright holders to
create license agreements. As such, these secondary digital
marketplaces could exist regardless of legislation or judicial
decisions. These initiatives could provide consumers with resale
rights—at the cost of restricting freedom and reducing usedcontent prices. The scheme under these patents could constrain
the secondary market for digital goods—not by the items’ quality or
availability, but by the license agreements (which would be dictated
by the copyright holder). And if copyright holders extract a portion
of each resale, this premium would be borne by either the seller or
the buyer—raising the cost. Because a marketplace-driven solution
would benefit both copyright holders and the marketplace owners
(e.g., Amazon and Apple), a marketplace solution appears to be
inevitable. Content owners may well work to create this
marketplace—if only to stave off legislative or judicial action that
could result in a system more favorable to consumers.
VI. IS DIGITAL FIRST SALE ALREADY OBSOLETE?
Any application of digital first sale requires some semblance of
“ownership”: the copyright holder must make a “first sale” of a
134
But recent
copy, and the recipient must “own” the copy.
marketplace developments have brought into question whether
consumer “ownership” (the twentieth century’s prevailing schema)
will become a relic. The marketplace has seen the rise of “all you
can eat” monthly license schemes, such as those provided by Netflix
(movies and television), Spotify (music), Pandora (music), Google
135
All Access (music), and Scribd (books). These revenue models

133. Chris Berdik, As Good As New: ReDigi Plans to Start Selling Used E-Books, BOS.
MAG. (May 2013), http://www.bostonmagazine.com/news/article/2013/04/30
/redigi-selling-used-e-books/.
134. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2012).
135. E.g., SCRIBD.COM, http://www.scribd.com/subscribe (“Read [u]nlimited
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permit copyright holders to avoid § 109—and its limitation of the
distribution right—by unambiguously licensing, not “selling,”
content. One might argue that under the current licenses, a digitalcontent “purchase” is a misnomer; instead, it is merely a lifetime
lease. In effect, a “buyer” merely rents for life. And through
streaming services, such implicit rentals become explicit.
A.

The Rise of the License

Today, sales of nearly all digital goods are subject to some form
136
of license. Those licenses are nearly universally contracts of
adhesion, preventing consumers from negotiating the license
terms—which unsurprisingly tend to favor copyright holders. For
example, the iTunes terms of service currently limit consumers to
making copies for only personal, noncommercial use; limit the
number of permitted devices; and limit how many times music files
137
can be copied (burned) to an audio CD. The license agreements
138
139
for Amazon
and Google
similarly restrict users’ rights—
including the right to transfer ownership.
These license agreements are usually click-wrap agreements:
consumers ostensibly assent by clicking an “I accept” button during
[b]ooks for $8.99/month.”) (last visited Dec. 20, 2013).
136. Raymond T. Nimmer, Copyright First Sale and the Over-Riding Role of
Contract, 51 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1311, 1321 (2011) (“[M]ost authorized
distributions of copyrighted works occur in the context of a contract-based
exchange.”). Nimmer also notes, “[I]t is the terms of the contract transferring the
copy that determine whether ownership has been transferred.” Id. at 1312.
137. Terms and Conditions, APPLE.COM, http://www.apple.com/legal/internet
-services/itunes/us/terms.html#SALE (last updated Sept. 18, 2013) (“Any burning
or exporting capabilities are solely an accommodation to you and shall not
constitute a grant, waiver, or other limitation of any rights of the copyright owners
in any content embodied in any iTunes Product.”).
138. Amazon MP3 Store: Terms of Use, AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com/gp
/help/customer/display.html?nodeId=200154280 (last updated Aug. 13, 2013)
(“Upon payment for Music Content, we grant you a non-exclusive, nontransferable right to use the Music Content only for your personal, noncommercial purposes, subject to the Agreement.”).
139. Google Play Terms of Service, GOOGLE PLAY (Nov. 20, 2013),
http://play.google.com/intl/en_us/about/play-terms.html (“You may not sell,
rent, lease, redistribute, broadcast, transmit, communicate, modify, sublicense or
transfer or assign your rights to Products to any third party without authorization,
including with regard to any downloads of Products that you may obtain through
Google Play.”).
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the download or installation process. Though some have
questioned such agreements’ validity, courts have enforced them so
long as consumers demonstrate their assent—through clicking or
140
otherwise. And because these agreements operate outside of the
Copyright Act—as the copyright holders’ right to license works—
they permit restrictions not specifically addressed by the Copyright
141
Act, the DMCA, first-sale exemptions, or the fair-use doctrine.
What is prohibited under the Copyright Act can be permitted
under license, and vice versa. Under click-wrap agreements,
copyright holders are largely free to add terms not contemplated
under the Copyright Act, and they may ostensibly require
consumers to waive rights that they would otherwise possess under
the first-sale and fair-use doctrines. Because most consumers
decline to fully read (much less comprehend) their click-wrap
licenses, many would be surprised to discover that when they click
“Buy,” they do not become legal owners. Rather, they are essentially
lessors renting (1) for the duration of their lives, (2) without the
ability to sell the copies, and (3) without the ability to lend the
copies to friends or family. In short, consumers do not “own” the
works that they “buy.”
B.

The Rise of Subscription Services

It may be too early to lament the dilution of digital ownership.
Consumers are adopting a distribution method where they know
they do not own the works: subscription services. For a monthly fee,
those services provide nearly unlimited access to immense libraries
142
143
144
of movies, music, and books —and copyright holders do so
140. See, e.g., ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449 (7th Cir. 1996)
(holding that shrink-wrap licenses are enforceable, provided that the underlying
contract is not objectionable). But see Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306
F.3d 17, 32 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that clicking on a “Download” button was not
sufficient to designate acceptance).
141. See Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630, 638 (8th Cir. 2005)
(holding that shrink-wrap license restricting reverse engineering that would have
been allowed under DMCA exemption was valid and enforceable).
142. Sage Vanden Heuvel, Fighting the First Sale Doctrine: Strategies for a
Struggling Film Industry, 18 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 661, 668 (2012)
(noting that Netflix has over twenty-one million subscribers for its “Watch
Instantly” streaming video service).
143. See, e.g., Seth Ericsson, The Recorded Music Industry and the Emergence of
Online Music Distribution: Innovation in the Absence of Copyright (Reform), 79 GEO.
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without purporting to make a single sale. Such users do not “own”
the content any more than a cable subscriber “owns” the movie on
HBO. Under these services, copyright holders and service providers
145
negotiate and enter license agreements that avoid any “sale”
under the Copyright Act—and any trigger of its fair-use and firstsale doctrines. Under all of these models, copyright owners do not
provide ownership; they merely provide access.
Software companies such as Adobe and Microsoft have also
begun moving away from the “purchase” schema to subscriptions,
limiting popular software packages—such as Adobe Creative Studio
and Microsoft Office—exclusively or nearly exclusively via
146
subscription models.
This scheme has some benefits for consumers. First, it
mitigates the cost of amassing huge libraries of digital works—the
era of the fabled “jukebox in the sky” has arrived. In addition,
subscription services permit users to “sample” many different artists
and genres without having to pay for albums or tracks to determine
if they are to the user’s taste. Finally, subscription services can free
users from the need to curate their music libraries.
Arguably more important, however, are the economic benefits
that this shift promises to copyright holders and distributers. For
example, a subscriber base provides a steady stream of regular
income that copyright holders can list as assets on their balance
sheets. In addition, customers are more willing to allow themselves
to become “locked in” to a particular subscription ecosystem than
to a retail service. Finally, subscription services can allow publishers
and distributors to create customers for life—since young
subscribers cannot just buy music that they like until they are thirty

WASH. L. REV. 1783, 1791 (2011) (discussing Google All Access, Rhapsody,
Napster, Grooveshark, and Spotify).
144. See, e.g., GEORGE B. DELTA & JEFFREY H. MATSUURA, LAW OF THE INTERNET
§ 6.04 (3d ed. 2013), available at Westlaw LOTIN (discussing the Amazon Prime
lending library model); Jenna Schnuer, We Test It: Scribd’s All-You-Can Read Digital
Buffet, ENTREPRENEUR, http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/229666 (last visited
Jan. 25, 2014) (discussing Scribd’s e-book service).
145. See generally DELTA & MATSUURA, supra note 144. (“[M]any sellers attempt
to override established first sale doctrine principles through limitations included
in their licenses.”).
146. Hayley Tsukayama, Adobe’s Subscription Model and the Future of Software,
WASH. POST (May 7, 2013), 2013 WLNR 11189193.
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and then pull out of the system (having amassed all of the music
they wished to amass).
These services free consumers from the perceived hassles of
building and maintaining a media library. In addition, they provide
copyright holders with a steady stream of revenue based on actual
usage of their digital goods. Therefore, subscription services appear
likely to continue their popularity among copyright holders and
consumers alike.
C.

Digital First Sale: Potentially Only Relevant for a Sliver in Time

As consumers increasingly enjoy heavenly access to millions of
songs from the Cloud—presciently dubbed by turn-of-the-century
147
commentators as the “celestial jukebox” —the importance of
“owning” digital content decreases. This shift to subscription
services may well result in “ownership” of digital content—as was
the standard for physical copies in the twentieth century—
becoming a mere footnote in the history of copyright.
The rise of subscription models may well make the concept of
“owning” a copyrighted work obsolete—a relic. For copyrighted
content distributed in the twentieth century, those physical goods
will continue to remain covered under the existing first-sale
doctrine. And for subscription services like Netflix, Spotify, Google
Music All Access, and Scribd, the lack of any “sale” makes digital
first sale a nonissue. So the only content affected by a digital firstsale doctrine would be the ever-decreasing “sales” of downloaded
content. And the licenses under which that content is sold may
thwart consumers’ attempts to assert sufficient “ownership” to
alienate their possession of content.
If the marketplace’s scales continue to tip almost exclusively
toward subscription services, then historians may well look back on
the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries’ consumers’ obsession
with “owning” content as a strange position, indeed. If streaming’s
popularity continues unabated, the populace may eventually ask—
as the copyright holders in Bobbs-Merrill essentially asked—”Who
can own a copyrighted work but the copyright holder?” Streaming
relies on licenses, and when a consumer stops subscribing,
147. Janelle Brown, The Jukebox Manifesto, SALON (Nov. 13, 2000, 2:30 PM),
http://www.salon.com/2000/11/13/jukebox/ (popularizing the term “celestial
jukebox”).
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copyright holders simply turn off the spigot. No consumer could
justifiably complain that he or she “owns” a Netflix movie or a
Spotify song. In a world dominated by the subscription model,
concerns of digital ownership could well fade into the ether.
VII. CONCLUSION
Physical works and their digital counterparts are
fundamentally different, making any direct application of § 109’s
first-sale doctrine to digital goods less appealing. But as media is
increasingly sold digitally, consumers’ inability to trade, lend, sell,
or even bequeath digital works could well serve to eliminate the
first-sale doctrine altogether. In the current marketplace,
consumers’ appetite for digital content remains strong, so Congress
is unlikely to intervene. Similarly, given the robust marketplace—as
well as the sticky policy considerations for selling identical, nondegradable digital copies—courts may well continue to be reluctant
to reinterpret § 109.
Given the state of the marketplace, the legal status of digital
content could shift in one of two directions. In the first scenario,
consumers’ inability to resell digital goods could lower their value
and reduce prices, which would encourage distributors to create
walled-garden resale markets that permit copyright holders and
suppliers to extract rents from each additional sale. In the second
scenario, consumers’ increased adoption of all-you-can-eat
subscription services would make the concept of consumers
“owning” content obsolete: a relic of the twentieth century. Under
either scenario—both ostensibly governed by licenses, not the firstsale doctrine—the concept of “digital first sale” could well fade into
history as a legal curiosity that neither had nor needed any formal
resolution.
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